Recent Development of Agricultural Policy in Vietnam (1)

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Abstract

From an agro-political viewpoint, the development process of Vietnamese agriculture after 1976 can be divided into four major stages. (1) The 1976-1980 period was characterized by the rapid dissemination of agricultural collectives and their dismantling in the southern part of Vietnam. (2) The 1981-1988 period corresponded to the transitional stage of remaining agricultural collectives from a bureaucratic system to a farmers' self-determining system under the "contract 100" system. (3) In the 1989-1992 period, the bureaucratic mechanism was abandoned and peasant households were recognized as completely self-determining production units under the "*doi moi*" policy. (4) After 1993, Resolution Number 5 promulgated by the Communist Party pursued the renovation process. The land law reform assured long-term land users' rights. Elements of rural development policy were improved. However, organization by the farmers' own effort is an important subject for which problems such as rural credit system and extension system should be addressed.

Key words: Agricultural collectivization, *Doi moi* policy, Contract system, Land law reform

(I): See note in p.29

The development of Vietnamese agriculture was characterized by a remarkable stagnancy and resurgence after the liberation of the southern part of Vietnam in 1975. This process was closely related to the changes in the agricultural policy. The development process of the policy can be divided into the following four major stages: (Table 1)

(1) 1976-1980: Period of agricultural collectivization in the South

(2) 1981-1988: Period of contract system in collective farms

(3) 1989-1992: Period of renovation (*doi moi*) policy after Resolution Number 10 promulgated by the Politburo of the Party Central Committee.

(4) 1993-: Period of renovation (*doi moi*) policy after Resolution Number 5 promulgated by the Party Central Committee.

However, the agricultural policy itself reflected the conditions of agricultural production. Due to the stagnation in agricultural production, the government was forced to modify the agricultural policy. As a result, there is a dialectical process between the agricultural policy and agricultural production in the Vietnamese present-day history. This paper intends to describe the relationship between these two aspects after 1976. Especially attention will be paid to the region of the Mekong Delta(2) which is the most important agricultural region in Vietnam since it supplies actually more than half of the national output of paddy.

Incidentally, we will refer to the Co Do farm, Can Tho province, one of the agricultural cooperatives that are actually operating in the Mekong Delta. Though the history of the Co Do farm does not correspond exactly to the development stages of the agricultural policy, it will illustrate some aspects of this process.

1976-1980 period

The basic characteristic of this period was the rapid development followed by dismantling of agricultural collectives in the South.

In the North, agricultural collectives were well established, from the end of the 1950s throughout the 1960s and functioned as a social base of the resistance during the war (Furuta [6]). In 1971, 96% of the farm households of the North were organized into collectives (IASV[9]). Until 1975, the economy of the South was based on private enterprises. After the liberation, the Ha Noi government tried to introduce the model of the North to the South. During the 4th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in December 1976, it was eventually decided that southern agriculture should adopt a socialist model.

After pilot cooperatives were established in Tan Hoi (Tien Giang province), a former base of the National Liberation Front, agricultural collectivization under two forms of cooperatives (low-grade cooperatives and experimental high-grade cooperatives) as well as production groups was promoted by the government in the South. This approach was adopted more rapidly in the central coastal region and the central highlands than in the other regions of the South, since the collectivization in the former regions enabled agriculture to recover after the war. Farmers in the Mekong Delta, however, resisted the collectivization, except in some settlement areas.

●verview of the Co Do farm: The farm was established in a former plantation area. Immediately after the South was liberated, the Vietnamese People Army took over this land area. In early April 1976, the planning staff of the Co Do farm held their first meeting in Ho Chi Minh City, fixed the opening ceremony of the farm and drafted a plan to take over the land area from the People Army. In June 1976, an office of the farm was built near the Co Do market. In December, administrators and workers of the farm

Table1. Recent development of agricultural policy in Vietnam

	1976-1980	1981-1988	1989-1992	After 1993
Agricultural policy	Rapid dissemination and dismantling of agricultural collectives in the South.	Transition of remaining agricultural collectives from a bureaucratic system to an autonomous system under "contract 100".	Recognition of multiple structure of agricultural production and complete autonomy of farm households.	Reform of the land law. Enactment of rural development policy.
Agricultural production (paddy, etc.)	Serious stagnation.	Marked increase during the 1981-1986 period. Decline in 1987.	Higher increase than in previous years. Export of paddy since 1989.	Higher increase than in previous years. Development of diversified cropping systems.
Farmers' situation	Involvement of farmers in the collectivization movement and land adjustment in the South.	Farmers' management of three production phases in the collectives. Decrease of income of individual farmers due to the new agriculture tax.	Occurrence of land disputes. Emergence of differentiation of farmers.	Intensification of differentiation of farmers.



Fig.1. Paddy prpduction (whole country)
Source: General Statistical Office [18], Cuc [4]

numbered about 100. In January 1977, the Agricultural Department of Hau Giang province (actual Can Tho province) enacted Decree 50 to establish the Co Do farm. The Ministry of Agriculture elected then a farm's director board based on the proposal of the planning staff.

The production groups allowed farmers to continue to own essential production goods like land, buffaloes, oxen and agricultural implements. However, integrated production was encouraged through participation in seasonal work teams. Members of the teams undertook collective work during labor-peak periods, such as planting or harvesting of paddy. There was no payment for participation in the teams, since this was considered as mutual aid.

In the low-grade cooperatives, the private ownership of the essential production goods was also secured. A form of piecework was practiced in the cooperatives. Organized farmers were only responsible for their work under contract that accounted for part of the total work. The farmers received work-points for their activities and wages based on the work-points. Another part of cooperatives' production was also attributed to each farmer according to his ownership of essential production goods. (Shiraishi [15])

All the essential production goods were collectivized in the high-grade cooperatives. These goods had to be resold to the province by farmers with an assessed value so that they could be distributed to the cooperatives and used as collective production goods. The farmers derived their income only from piecework in the collective systems. On the other hand, a part of the land was allotted to the collective farmers for private holding, but the total area was limited to 5 % of the total cultivated land area of the cooperative. The high-grade cooperatives resembled the soviet collective farms, the kolkhoz.

The main problem of cooperatives' production was the low efficiency. Distribution system in the collective farms was too much concentrated on egalitarianism, reducing producers' motivation. The applied distribution standard to the collective farmers was "13kg of paddy per month (minimum) and 18kg (maximum)" (Cuc [4]). This in fact meant that all the households shared poverty equally, leveling their contribution, constraining their ability and reducing their will to work.

Distribution system was also reorganized according to the agricultural collectivization. In 1978, private commerce was completely prohibited and almost all the retailers worked in the commerce and industry collectives.

The policy on land adjustment by adopting an "even" approach was implemented to promote the

establishment of the cooperatives from the end of 1978. A part of the land areas owned by rich farmers, rural capitalists or top-part of medium-scale farmers, exceeding their necessary minimum, was confiscated or purchased. It was distributed then to poor farmers or landless employees. The distribution principle was that each adult should receive from 0.10 to 0.15 ha based on the quality of land and access to an irrigation system. Each child less than 16 years old and adult over 60 received half of that amount. However, the farmers were quickly asked to provide the parcels that they received for the collectives. This policy prevented the farmers' differentiation process that had lasted for a long time in the South. As a result, the nucleus of agricultural productivity, i.e. rich farmers, was harmed.

Incidentally, remaining independent farmers faced various difficulties. Ownership of essential production goods was also prohibited. All the capital assets had to be sold to the provincial government with an assessed value. As for the organization of the farmers into cooperatives, though three principles of democratic control, agreement and reciprocity were recognized, in fact farmer's admission was frequently forced by various administrative means. For example, when an independent farmer rejected the admission, pressure was applied onto him by preventing the sale of production goods such as fertilizers, pesticides and gasoline, and his admission was forced. Such a farmer was forced to decrease the amount of agricultural production due to the shortage of production goods (Idei[8]).

Natural disasters aggravated the situation. In 1977, an outbreak of brown planthoppers damaged most of the traditional rice varieties in the Mekong Delta, particularly in the Tien Giang and Ben Tre provinces. In 1978, a serious flood damaged the agricultural production in most of the area of the Mekong Delta. (Sanh [14])

The paddy productivity in the Mekong Delta during the 1976-1980 period fluctuated widely and adversely affected the agricultural collectivization. The paddy output ranged there between 3.2 million and 5.2 million tons during this period, while that in the whole country ranged between 9.8 million and 11.8 million tons (Fig. 1). Due to the stagnation of productivity, farmers' main income derived from the collective farms gradually declined (Cuc [4]).

Some cooperatives were dismantled immediately after their establishment in the South. The climax of the cooperatives' dismantling occurred at the end of 1979. By 1980, 1,518 cooperatives including 1,005 high-grade cooperatives and 9,350 production groups were established in the South, attracting 35.6% of farm households (Cuc [4])[(3)]. However, at the end of 1980, only 137 cooperatives and 3,939 production groups remained there (Kimura [11]).

1981-1988 period

Due to the severe agricultural stagnation, a system of production under contract was applied by some agricultural cooperatives in the northern provinces, though it was not recognized legally. The most famous experiment was conducted in Hai Phong City in 1977. The agricultural production increased dramatically there. The Central Party Secretariat enacted Directive Number 100 on "improvement of contractual activities, and extension of contract production to labor groups and individuals in the agricultural production cooperatives" (popularly known as "contract 100") in January 1981, approving the "back-dealing" process.

Though "contract 100" was an incomplete reform, it had some advantages compared with the former type of piecework, as part of farmers' self-determination in land use and in labor use was re-established. According to this system, land still remained under state control. However, each parcel of land was entrusted to a family within a five-year period. Each farmer made a contract with a collective to produce a certain amount of output on his land. Farmers were allowed to manage three phases of cultivation; planting, tending and harvesting. These three categories were considered to be efficient when they were left to the farmers. However, land preparation, irrigation, seed procurement and input supply were still handled by the collectives. The output under contract had to be sold to the collectives with a fixed price. Farmers could keep all the output beyond the amount under contract for themselves. Farm households were motivated to

surpass the output under contract. However, the "contract 100" system had some limitations as follows (Xuan chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.*[10], Cuc [4]):

1. Land preparation, irrigation, seed procurement as well as input supply were still handled by the collectives. The centralized input supply also persisted. When the State experienced financial difficulties, the supply of inputs to the farmers was inadequate and untimely. The State Planning Commission made land use decisions in a usual top-down approach even though the farmers might know the most profitable crop.
2. Contractual levels of production were not fixed and adjusted year by year because the collectives sought to raise them. Thus farmers' motivation to exceed the output under contract was curbed.
3. The lack of long-term land tenure prevented the farmers from investing for long-term land productivity, like the construction of irrigation systems.
4. Prolongation of working hours only for acquiring more working points was still prevalent, leading to the corruption of collective farmers.

However, paddy production increased markedly during the 1981–1986 period. The total paddy output of the country grew at an average annual rate of 5.4% during this period, in contrast to only 1.4% during the 1976-1981 period. However, paddy production declined in 1987. Paddy output in the whole country recorded in 1986 and in 1987 was 16.0 million and 15.1 million tons, respectively, corresponding to a decrease of 0.9 million tons (Fig. 1). Accordingly, food shortage occurred in early 1988 in 21 provinces and cities (Cuc[4]). This decline was attributed to the following three factors; 1) unusual weather in 1987[(4)], 2) limitations of "contract 100", 3) negative influence of collectivization in the South on individual farmers.

Actually, in the South, the "contract 100" system was placed within the context of the promotion of agricultural collectivization. By the introduction of the new agricultural tax in February 1983, a surtax was imposed on the individual farmers in addition to the land tax based on the grade of cultivated fields. As a result, the income of the individual farmers decreased rapidly. They experienced management difficulties and were forced to join the collectives. The introduction of this new agricultural tax created a big pressure upon the individual farmers who had resisted the admission to the collectives. The number of individual farmers decreased rapidly due to this administrative measure. As a result, agricultural production was adversely affected in the South. (Idei [8])

The Co Do farm continued to adopt the same management system during this period as before 1981. In 1986, the farm had 456 staff members organized into the following 2 large groups.

1. A production group including four production teams, namely cultivation team, tractor team with forty tractors, irrigation team and mechanic team.
2. One administrator group including nine departments, one clinic, and one service team.

The Co Do farm planted then 3,985 hectares of paddy (3,670 hectares of traditional floating rice, 165 hectares of modern summer-autumn rice and 150 hectares of modern winter-spring rice) and harvested 6,197 tons, yielding only 1.56 ton/hectare.

In 1986, the 6th National Deputy Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party enacted comprehensive socio-economic renovation policies. The Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee promulgated Resolution Number 10 on the renovation of agricultural management in April 1988. The Resolution was legalized by a number of government ordinances. It introduced a new renovation stage in Vietnamese agriculture.

1989-1992 period

The period after 1989 could be referred to as the period under the *doi moi* policy. However, this period will be divided into two parts: before and after the promulgation of the Party Central Resolution Number 5 in 1992.

During the 1989-1992 period, the agricultural growth rate was higher than that in the former period. Gross paddy output increased steadily from 17 million tons to 21.6 million tons during the period 1988-1992 (Fig. 1). The rate of increase of paddy output for the period was 27.0%, compared with 9.6% in the former five-year period. Since 1989, Vietnam production of paddy had not only aimed at fulfilling domestic consumption, but had also provided a surplus for exports [(5)].

These achievements can be attributed to the

following factors:

Resolution Number 10 promoted further renovation of the agricultural management system. It recognized the multiple structure of agricultural production and ensured that farm households would operate as completely self-determining economic units compared with the former period, by abolishing the bureaucratic management system of agricultural production. Ownership and distribution were adjusted.

Ownership aspects: Resolution Number 10 recognized the supremacy of the farmers' private ownership for essential production goods, like machines, buffaloes, oxen and agricultural implements. Since the late 1988, input supply had been handled by provincial authorities rather than by the central government. Private traders were also allowed to handle the marketing of most of the inputs. Farmers could purchase and sell these production goods in the market from that time. Some of the collectives' essential production goods were valued and sold off to the farmers.

Along with these production goods, Resolution Number 10 provided land user rights to the farmers for a longer period of time, namely 15 years except for perennial crops (30-50 years). The size of the land entrusted to each farm household was determined according to the number of work-age members. Land area was distributed evenly to each work-age member with some modifications based on the level of soil fertility and access to irrigation(6). Generally agricultural collectives depended on the collectives for only water management and plant protection; other operations were left to households' management.

This contractual form considerably reduced the activities of the collectives. The number of staff members belonging to the collective executive board decreased by half. Management costs of the collectives were also markedly reduced.

Distribution aspects: According to Ordinance 170, issued by the Council of Ministers on 14 November 1988, the farmers acquired the right to own all the products harvested on the fields under contract in exchange for subtracting tax by law and contribution to the collectives. Tax determined based on the level of soil fertility could be paid either in the form of paddy or money. Farmers were allowed to trade surplus products freely in the market. Farmers were no longer required to sell an amount of paddy under contract to the government. Private traders were given the same rights as those of the government to purchase products from farmers. However, public companies continued to monopolize the foreign trade.

The promulgation of Resolution Number 10 was a significant improvement, compared with "contract 100", by abolishing the distribution system of work-points and recognizing farmers' self-determination in production. Farmers knew how much they would receive at the start of crop production, which encouraged them to invest more capital and labor to increase their revenues above the tax and contribution to the collectives. Modern rice varieties with high yield were rapidly disseminated due to the investment made for the construction of irrigation facilities. However, the following problems appeared during this period:

Land disputes in southern rural areas started to occur: Resolution Number 10 changed the period of land tenure from 5 years formerly to 15 years. Farmers considered it as a reversion to the private system of land holding. Moreover, the collective farms could be dismantled and the active role of private management was recognized. Under such conditions, in several parts of the Mekong Delta, some former landowners who had lost their land during past land reforms attempted to recover some or all of the land. The same land was often claimed by more than one former landowner. As a result, agricultural production was adversely affected due to the confusion thus generated. (Hayami [7], Idei [8], Anh *et al.* chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.* [10])

Along with the expanding market economy, although the law prohibited the sale and purchase of land, illegal market where land user rights were bought and sold appeared. Under such conditions, differentiation of farmers became inevitable.

The rural infrastructure was poor. Commercial agricultural production requires the development of processing industries and distribution systems for the agricultural products, which depends on improved rural infrastructure, such as transportation, electrification,

telecommunications, water supply and sanitation, health centers and education. However, one of the problems of the policy in 1988 was the lack of a program of rural development. Priority of investment for rural infrastructure was low and not proportionate to the importance of agriculture in the national economy [7]. The central government covered about two-thirds of the total public expenditures (ministries for running expenditures and the State Planning Committee for capital expenditures). Local fiscal authorities were forced to draft provincial fiscal plans according to the recommendations of the central government (Porter chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.* [10]). The central government aimed at rapid industrialization with emphasis placed on heavy industry. Such a policy led to a concentration of investment for infrastructure in the urban areas.

In the South, traditional management system for existing rural infrastructure no longer functioned after the implementation of Resolution Number 10. Formerly, the agricultural collectives covered most of the expenses for the maintenance of the rural infrastructure, including power stations, rural transport network, school facilities and community health stations with subsidies granted from the provincial and central governments. Now, such subsidies were no longer available and the agricultural collectives could nor manage the rural infrastructure, which eventually underwent a process of degradation. (Anh *et al.* chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.* [10], Xuan [16]) [8][9]

Immediately before this period, the Co Do farm had faced serious difficulties in continuing to adopt the old management system. Almost all the agricultural machines of the farm had become old and had been broken without parts for repair. Thus the farm had lost the material base to continue the collective work and was forced to introduce a contract system for agricultural production in 1988 as follows: The farm invested in land preparation, seed, pesticides and fertilizers for paddy production. The farmers who made a contract with the farm were in charge of the other operations. After harvest, they refunded an amount of paddy equivalent to the value invested by the farm.

1993- period

This period started with Resolution Number 5 on "the continuation of the renovation and development of the economy and society in the countryside", which was enacted by the Party Central Committee during the 7th Party Congress in June 1993. The land law reform and the government decrees on extension work were also passed in 1993. The 1993 measures accelerated the renovation process of agriculture and drafted the components of a standard system of rural development. New aspects in the land law reform were as follows: (Hayami [7], Kerkvliet chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.* [10])

1. Certificates of land ownership can be delivered to settling land users (article 2). The state established cadastres throughout the country before the delivery.
2. The 1993 law prohibited reclaiming of land that had already been entrusted to someone else during the process of implementing land policies (article 2).
3. The land law reform recognized five rights of the land users; exchange of land use rights, transfer, lease, inheritance and mortgage (article 3). The law did not refer to the purchase and sale of the land and neither permitted nor forbade it. Hence the law could be applied to land transfer.
4. The period of land commitment for farm households was extended to 20 years for annual crops and aqua-culture, and 50 years for perennial crops, with a possibility of renewal (article 20).
5. The law fixed at 3ha the upper limit of retained area of annually cropped land (article 44).

The prolongation of the land use rights encouraged farmers to invest in land reclamation and construction of irrigation system. Under the impact of the land law reform, agricultural production experienced a considerable development after 1993. Annual average of total paddy output, sown areas and paddy yield in the 1993-1995 period increased by 19.7%, 11.8% and 11.4%, respectively, compared with the values in the 1989-1992 period. The amount of exported rice increased from 1.6 million tons in 1990 to 2.1 million tons in 1995. As for rice cultivation, traditional single cropping system with low and unstable yield shifted rapidly to modern double cropping system with high and stable yield in the Mekong Delta.

Consideration should be given to other crops, since the change from rice mono-cropping toward

diversified cropping systems with vegetables, beans, industrial crops, fruit trees, aqua-culture and animal husbandry characterized the farming systems in the Mekong Delta during this period [10].

In spite of these achievements, problems remained in the rural areas. In many provinces of the North, the granting of long-term land use rights to farmers was implemented too slowly, whereas, in the South, the rights had been granted before the enactment of Resolution Number 5. However, some complex social problems arose: Differentiation of farmers, which had started during the former period, was intensified during this period along with the development of a market economy in the rural areas. The land distribution concept of Resolution Number 10 had brought about a limited division of land resources among the farmers. Poor farmers without capital and farm management experience had still received the same land plot area per labor power as that of rich farmers with enough capital and good farm management experience. Many poor farmers had sold the entrusted land immediately after the enactment of Resolution Number 10. Furthermore, the market-oriented economy led to the fluctuation of paddy price since there was not sufficient official guarantee against such a fluctuation. For example, high paddy production in the spring of 1998 brought about an oversupply of paddy in the domestic market, which led to a fall of paddy price. As a result, some marginal farmers were unable to purchase inputs for the next cropping season like fertilizers, insecticides and gasoline.

After the elimination of the centralized input supply, farmers' need for credit had become intensive. The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture (VBA) was established in 1990 for financing rural public institutions, farmers and emerging private businesses[11]. It officially extended loans to farmers from mid-1991 and thereafter concentrated its effort on the supply of credit (Chinh [3], Fforde *et al.* chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.*[10]). However, due to the limitation in funds, the VBA could only give short-term loans, which were allotted for the seasonal cropping. Also, credit rules, with complicated procedures and collateral arrangements, effectively prevented some households from getting VBA loans (Anh *et al.* chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.* [10]). Physical problems, such as the absence of branches and roads in remote areas, did not enable some households to obtain credit. The lack of credit resulted in the reliance of borrowers on the private saving and informal credit networks, charging a higher interest rate. According to the *Vietnam Living Standards Survey* in 1994, the average interest rate for loans from private moneylenders (101.8% per year) was about 2.6 times higher than the VBA rates of 39% per year (Abiad [1]). In many cases, informal credit was an important factor for land concentration.

Agricultural extension system did not operate well under the renovation policy. The budget cuts reduced the capacity of the agricultural services, and many agricultural technicians were dismissed. Government Decree Number 13 was promulgated in 1993 to set up a national extension service for agriculture. It outlined the structure and functions of the official extension system from central to district levels. However, it was not well implemented, as evidenced by the fact that only a few official extension workers were employed in each province (Eklof [5]).

The number of households who derived their main income from hired work increased rapidly and accounted for a large part in the rural areas. Surveys in O Mon district, Can Tho province, Mekong Delta, conducted by the Cuu Long Delta Rice Research Institute (CLRRI), showed that the percentage of households engaged in non-agricultural occupations, mainly in hired work, was estimated at 10.8 % in 1993, but reached 15.4 % in 1996 [12]. The number of unemployed or under-employed people increa-sed in the countryside. There were about six-to-seven million unemployed people in the rural areas in the mid-90s (Anh *et al.* chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.*[10]), indicating that the rearrangement process did not operate properly. Small industries were underdeveloped due to the conditions described previously in the rural areas.

Rural income generally lagged behind urban income. Based on the multi-target household survey conducted by the General Statistical Office in 1994, the average monthly income per capita was 269 thousand dong in the urban areas and 148 thousand dong in the rural areas (Bich *et al.* [2]). This income

disparity led to a migration of rural labor to cities. Ho Chi Minh City had the largest number of migrants from rural areas. However, all the migrants could not always find jobs in the city. Based on the data of city's government, 700 thousand people came to Ho Chi Minh City in 1996, of which 600 thousand were permanent migrants and 100 thousand were seasonal migrants. Among them, 32% of the migrants found a stable job and 8% were totally unemployed (Bich *et al.* [2]).

Immediately after the promulgation of Resolution Number 5, the Co Do farm was faced with the farmers' demand for returning back the land confiscated by the farm during the latter half of the 1970s. The land dispute was very severe and, in 1994, the Co Do farm returned the land use rights to the farmers based on their land ownership before 1975. As a result, the farm returned 1,618 hectares of land use rights to 592 households, still retaining about 1,100 farmers under contract and 5,350 hectares of cultivated land.

Conclusion

After nearly all the collective farms were dismantled or had lost their ability to control agricultural production, only some state farms and farmer organizations, such as Farmer Associations, Woman Unions and Youth Groups, remained in the rural areas of the Mekong Delta. These organizations had local branches up to the commune level. They were formerly executive organs of the central policy. After the decrease of funding of these organizations by the government and the decline of central control under the renovation policy, the organizations became mere political institutions. Farmers joined them voluntarily and proclaimed their solidarity with the Communist Party [(13)]. Although the farmers were allowed to cultivate their land and to sell their products to anyone who bought them at the best price, their bargaining power against private buyers was weak. Furthermore, the credit system and the extension system could not satisfy the needs of the farmers. As a result, farmers' poverty persisted in the rural areas of the Mekong Delta. (Xuan [16])

For further development of the farmers' economy in the Mekong Delta, establishment of strong farmer organizations may be necessary. They should be in charge of the coordinating of credit service, marketing and technology transfer. During the renovation process, new voluntary farmer organizations promoted by the Party have sprung up throughout the country. In some areas, farmer organizations at the commune level were able to activate farmers' voluntary organizations (Yamazaki *et al.*[17]). Such organizations were often supported by foreign NGOs.

Notes

(1) This paper is based on the literature listed in the references, interviews with the staff of the Co Do farm and discussions with some Vietnamese scientists.

(2) The Southern part of Vietnam comprises two principal regions: the Mekong Delta and the Southeast.

(3) Average scale of one cooperative was as follows: 312 ha of land, 519 farm households and 1,003 laborers. Average scale of one production group was 40 ha of land and 38 farm households (Cuc [4]).

(4) Nghiep[12] emphasizes this factor.

(5) A quota system had been applied to the amount of exported rice to secure the domestic supply.

(6) In practice, size of land allocated and the length of the lease could differ among collectives and communes depending on the local conditions (Que [13], Hayami [7]).

(7) The proportion of state investment in agriculture decreased from 20% in 1976 to 14% in 1991, while the agriculture contributed more than one-third of GDP (Que [13]).

(8) In the North, the agricultural collectives continued to be responsible for production and social services even after the implementation of Resolution Number 10 (Hayami [7]).

(9) Commune's People Committee assumed part of the collective's functions like land management, tax collection, enactment of social policies etc. (Anh *et al.* chapter, Kerkvliet *et al.* [10])

(10) During the long period of food shortage, the government could not turn animal husbandry into a key branch of agriculture, in spite of the recourse to administrative measures. Along with economic liberalization, demand for meat increased in the urban areas, which substantially stimulated this sector. (Que [13])

(11) VBA was the main lending bank for farmers but there were also other credit institutions in the rural areas. (Que [13])

(12) The data were obtained through discussions with Mr. N. X. Lai (CLRRI).

(13) Farmer Associations have been shifting their attention to the needs of their constituents.

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近年におけるベトナム農政の変遷

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摘要

南ベトナム解放が実現されて後のベトナム農業の展開過程は、農業政策の動向を基準にしながら次の 4 つの時期に大きく区分することができる。(1)1976 年―80 年 : この時期は、南ベトナムにおける農業集団化の急速な進展とその頓挫によって主に特徴づけられる。(2)1981 年―88 年 : この時期は、ベトナム共産党中央書記局 100 号指令によって導入された契約システムのもとで、集団農場が農民の自主性を尊重する方向へと大きく変化してゆく時期である。(3)1989―92 年 : ドイモイ（刷新）政策の農業部面における具体化である党中央委員会政治局 10 号決議は、農業生産における多部門構造を認め、農民を農業生産における主要な単位として位置づける。(4)1993 年以降 : 党中央委員会 5 号決議はドイモイ政策のもとで方向づけがなされた農業経済の構造改革を推し進めてゆく。土地法改正によって、農民の農地保有権がより長期間にわたって保証される。また、農村開発を目的とした諸制度の骨格が定められる。だが、金融、普及組織などいくつかの問題点が顕在化しつつあり、農民自身の努力による組織化が重要課題である。

キーワード : 農業集団化、ドイモイ政策、請負制度、土地法改正